

## IN THIS REPORT

Public Chapter 1057 of 2008, which created the County Revenue Partnership Fund (CRPF), also directed that TACIR "thoroughly study and evaluate the provisions of this act and related policy matters and shall report its findings and recommendations to the finance, ways and means committees of the senate and the house of representatives on or before June 30, 2010." This report fulfills that requirement. It provides background on the CRPF and other revenue sharing measures and analyzes concerns and issues related to funding and distributing the CRPF. While this report does not offer specific recommendations, it does note what will be required structurally to provide significant appropriations to the CRPF.

## COUNTY REVENUE PARTNERSHIP FUND

*by Stan Chervin, Ph.D.*

### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Public Chapter No. 1057 of 2008 created the County Revenue Partnership Fund (CRPF) within the state general fund to be distributed to county and metropolitan governments. Funding is to come from specific appropriations from the not earmarked portion of state sales tax revenue. Only 36% of state sales tax revenue is currently not earmarked. Any CRPF appropriations, if made, cannot exceed state sales tax revenue distributed in the previous fiscal year to municipalities. The legislation required that the Tennessee Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations study and evaluate the new law and report its findings and recommendations by June 30, 2010.

The report reviewed existing intergovernmental aid programs, including tax-sharing arrangements between the state and local governments. Total state intergovernmental aid to local governments already exceeds \$6 billion, the largest component of which is state aid in support of education (Basic Education Program). State tax sharing itself amounted to \$828 million in fiscal year 2008. The single largest tax-sharing program involves the distribution of a portion of state motor fuel taxes to both cities and counties. Such funds are earmarked for use on local roads, highways, and bridges. The single largest tax-sharing program involving funds that are not earmarked is the distribution of a portion of state sales tax collections to municipalities.

The purpose of the CRPF is to facilitate potential future appropriations of unearmarked funds from future state sales tax

collections to county governments. Such funds would be similar to distributions now made to municipalities. Given the current economic and fiscal environment, it is not likely that any significant amounts will be appropriated.

The report notes that any significant future appropriations to the CRPF will only occur as a result of some combination of the following:

- unexpected rapid growth in existing state sales tax collections
- an increase in state sales tax rate
- significant broadening of the sales tax base (that would increase both state and local sales tax collections)
- significant changes in existing statutory tax sharing arrangements some of which date back to the early 20th century


While prior TACIR reports have raised questions regarding the various existing state tax-sharing arrangements, no specific recommendations are made in this report in regard to the County Revenue Partnership Fund.

## INTRODUCTION

Public Chapter No. 1057 of 2008 created a separate fund (County Revenue Partnership Fund) within the state general fund to be distributed to county and metropolitan governments (Nashville-Davidson County, Lynchburg-Moore County, and Hartsville-Trousdale County). Funding is to come from specific appropriations from the portion of state sales tax revenue identified in TCA 67-6-103 (a) (1).<sup>1</sup> As a result, any specific dollar appropriation made by the Legislature to the newly created fund would not impact funds

<sup>1</sup> TCA 67-6-103 establishes the distribution of state sales tax collections. TCA 67-6-103(a) (1) refers to the sales tax apportionment to the general fund (unearmarked portion).

specifically earmarked for education (TCA 67-6-103(a)(2)), municipalities (TCA 67-6-103 (a) (3)), the Department of Revenue (TCA 67-6-103(a)(4)), or the state sinking fund (TCA 67-6-103(a)(5)). Only 36% of state sales tax revenue is currently not earmarked (see accompanying pie chart).



The Legislature may make a specific dollar appropriation to the newly authorized fund beginning in any year after fiscal year 2008-2009. The appropriation in any year cannot exceed the amount appropriated in the previous fiscal year to municipalities pursuant to TCA 67-6-103(a)(3)(A). Estimated municipal fund distributions (from state sales tax collections) during fiscal year 2008-2009 are \$257 million.<sup>2</sup> Distributions from the County Revenue Partnership Fund are to be made monthly on the basis of population.

The Legislature has made only one appropriation to the CRPF since passage of the law. In the general appropriations act for 2009-2010, a portion of \$1,200,000 appropriated to the state as its share of the local costs of implementing SB 2357/HB 2389 is to be distributed to the CRPF. The Commissioner of Finance and Administration will determine the amount that is to assist in funding the local cost of various children's services and mental health.

<sup>2</sup> *State of Tennessee, The Budget for Fiscal Year 2009-2010*, page 92.

Public Chapter No. 1057 requires the Tennessee Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations to study and evaluate the new law and report its findings and recommendations by June 30, 2010.<sup>3</sup>

## **EXISTING STATE INTERGOVERNMENTAL AID TO CITIES AND COUNTIES**

In fiscal year 2007, state intergovernmental aid to Tennessee local governments was \$6.2 billion.<sup>4</sup> A majority of this amount was in the form of restricted categorical aid or grants, with two-thirds (approximately \$4.1 billion) representing state aid for elementary and secondary education (BEP). Only \$541.1 million (less than 9%) was distributed to local governments in the form of unrestricted general support aid, primarily from various state tax-sharing arrangements with cities and counties.

Previous reports by TACIR have detailed the many tax-sharing arrangements through which portions of Tennessee state taxes are distributed back to local governments. These distributions are required through specific earmarking provisions in the law, some of which date back to the early 20th century. Thirteen state taxes are shared with local governments.<sup>5</sup> During fiscal year 2008, \$828 million of state

taxes were shared with local governments.<sup>6</sup> Approximately 60% of this amount went to municipalities and 40% to counties. The single largest distribution (\$285.8 million) was from state gasoline and diesel fuel taxes (shared with counties and cities and earmarked for roads, highways, and bridges). The second largest distribution was from the state sales tax (\$267 million), almost all of which was distributed to municipalities with no use restrictions.

## **STATE SHARING OF SALES TAXES<sup>7</sup>**

Existing law that requires the sharing of state sales tax revenue with municipalities dates back to the original state sales tax law (1947). When the state sales tax was first passed in 1947, it required that 12.5% (of the revenue generated by the original 2% state sales tax) be distributed to cities on the basis of population. The portion of state sales tax revenue earmarked for municipalities and the per capita basis for its distribution have not changed in over 60 years.<sup>8</sup>

The legislation also provided that 70% (of total collections) be used for education, most of which, at the time, was provided by county governments. It also provided that if revenue collections exceeded \$20 million in any fiscal year, the excess was to be distributed 80% among the counties, 12.5% among the cities on a population basis, and 7.5% to the sinking fund. The amounts distributed to counties were earmarked for education, aid to dependent

<sup>3</sup> Public Chapter 1057 of 2008 provides that "The Tennessee advisory commission on intergovernmental relations shall thoroughly study and evaluate the provisions of this act and related policy matters and shall report its findings and recommendations to the finance, ways and means committee of the senate and the house of representatives on or before June 30, 2010."

<sup>4</sup> Public use data for Tennessee state government available at <http://www.census.gov/govs/www/state07.html>; accessed on July 29, 2009.

<sup>5</sup> See Green et al. January 2004, vi.

<sup>6</sup> Data from the Tennessee Department of Revenue. Excludes distributions of the state 17% wholesale beer tax.

<sup>7</sup> What follows has been excerpted from a prior TACIR publication; see "State Tax Sharing, Fairness, and Local Government Finance in Tennessee," TACIR Staff Report, January 2004, p.14-15.

<sup>8</sup> The 12.5% share at the original 2% tax rate is approximately the same as the current 4.5925% share of a 5.5% state sales tax (1.5% of the current state tax rate of 7% is totally earmarked to education).

children, aid to the blind, and for old age assistance.

Soon after the tax was levied, large “unanticipated” sales tax revenue began to flow into state coffers. The distribution of such “surplus” funds, primarily to counties soon generated some criticisms. Cries of an “unjust and indefensible situation” arose when studies showed that some rural areas were receiving (on an average daily attendance basis and a per capita basis) ten times the amounts received by metropolitan areas.

Over time, as the state sales tax rate was raised, the statutory percent shared with cities was reduced. This was to insure that the additional revenue generated by tax rate increases themselves went to the state general fund (generally for education). The dollar amounts distributed to city governments, however, have grown dramatically over the years. The municipal fund continues to be distributed, with a few exceptions, on the basis of population.<sup>9</sup> Prior TACIR reports on state tax sharing<sup>10</sup> have identified problems with tax sharing arrangements that are based solely on population without regard to local service levels and local fiscal need.

Since 2006 a minor amount of state sales tax revenue has been earmarked to certain county governments. This sharing with some county governments resulted from passage of the “Tennessee River Resort District Act.”<sup>11</sup> The states sales tax amounts distributed to county governments as a result of this legislation and certain other exceptions in the law amounted to less than \$3 million in fiscal year 2009. These

<sup>9</sup> The exceptions include Gatlinburg, Pigeon Forge, and several other locations that fall within the exceptions described at TCA 67-6-103(a)(3)(B) & (G).

<sup>10</sup> See TACIR reports identified in bibliography.

<sup>11</sup> Public Acts 2005, Chapter No. 212.

amounts do not impact the portion of the state sales tax earmarked for municipalities.<sup>12</sup>

## **PURPOSE OF LEGISLATION AND REVENUE IMPLICATIONS**

The largest amount of shared tax revenue to counties currently comes from distributions of gasoline and diesel fuel tax collections. All these funds are restricted (earmarked) for use on roads, highways, and bridges. While restricted, such funds are partly fungible and clearly release some unrestricted local funds that otherwise would be used for roads and highways for use elsewhere.<sup>13</sup>

The primary purpose of the legislation creating the County Revenue Partnership Fund is to facilitate a potential new source of unrestricted general fund revenue to counties similar to the unrestricted sales tax revenue shared with municipalities (4.59% of state sales tax revenue). While the legislation itself does not guarantee any new funds to counties, it does help position them in the future for consideration of an appropriation when state sales tax revenue improves. The existence of a special account that benefits counties will increase the likelihood in the future of appropriations to the account (CRPF) when and if state revenues finally recover from the protracted recession. The largest source of unrestricted shared revenue to counties now

<sup>12</sup> Any distributions made to Tennessee River Resort Districts are paid from the state general fund. Therefore, strictly speaking, the amounts received by counties as a result of the TRRD Act, while computed on the basis of state sales taxes collected in such districts, are not paid from state sales tax revenues.

<sup>13</sup> The 3 cent state gasoline tax increase in 1985 included some “maintenance of effort” requirements that somewhat reduced the fungibility of part of the restricted gasoline and diesel fuel tax distributions. Since six counties had a maintenance of effort requirement of \$0 and several others had requirements of less than \$100,000, these earmarked state funds were clearly partly to fully fungible.



comes from distributions of Tennessee Valley Authority in lieu of tax payments (gross receipts tax payments).

The legislation capped any fiscal year appropriation to the CRPF to the amount of state sales taxes distributed to municipalities in the previous fiscal year. As worded, any significant apportionments to the CRPF (or to counties or specific counties) could result from some combination of four factors:

1. Substantial and probably unanticipated increases in state sales tax collections
2. An increase in the state sales tax rate without the increase being fully earmarked for education use only
3. Significant broadening of the sales tax base to currently untaxed goods and services
4. A significant change in the existing methods of sharing all state tax revenues with local governments to better reflect local responsibility, local fiscal effort, and local fiscal capacity.

## DISCUSSION

### SUBSTANTIAL GROWTH IN STATE SALES TAX COLLECTIONS

It is not clear that this option (or turn of events) would provide county governments with significant new unrestricted revenue. Moreover, whatever distributions might be forthcoming from such a source will not represent a stable source of revenue. Such distributions are subject to specific appropriations and not automatic as are those resulting from specific tax-sharing distributions to municipalities. The level of funding in any given year is problematic.

### INCREASE IN STATE SALES TAX

In the current economic environment, an increase in the state sales tax rate to benefit primarily county governments is not likely. Eventually, the state will face increased fiscal pressure to replenish its operating revenues as well as its reserves. When that occurs, it is not likely that new programs or increased tax-sharing arrangements with county governments will be a priority. The requirement that appropriations to the CRPF come from the unrestricted sales tax distribution to the state's general fund makes it unlikely that any significant funding to the CRPF will be forthcoming any time soon.

### SIGNIFICANT BROADENING OF THE SALES TAX BASE TO CURRENTLY UNTAXED GOODS AND SERVICES

If the sales tax is broadened to include more services not currently in the sales tax base, county governments would benefit in two ways. First, county government local sales tax revenue will increase as a result of the base broadening. This increase will depend heavily on the size of the service sector in the county. Since 50% of the new revenue must be used for education (regardless of where collected within the county), county governments may get some relief from this portion of any resulting sales tax increase. The distribution of the remaining 50% increase in sales tax revenue will depend on where in the county the newly taxed services occur. Second, any increase in state sales tax revenue will increase all sales tax fund distributions, including the distribution to the unrestricted general fund account.<sup>14</sup> This increase may be used to apportion funds to the CRPF.

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<sup>14</sup> Unless the new revenue can be identified and is specifically earmarked for other uses.

## CHANGE IN DISTRIBUTION FORMULAS

While a distribution method based on population is administratively simple, it does not reflect differences in local government responsibilities, local government fiscal capacity, or local government fiscal effort. The failure of most current state tax sharing arrangements in dealing with and reflecting the reality of very different local responsibilities and fiscal capacities has been identified in prior TACIR publications. These major weaknesses<sup>15</sup> in existing tax sharing arrangements include

- distributions from the state sales tax to all municipalities based on population without regard to the types and level of local services provided;
- distributions to both cities and counties on a per capita basis even though in some cases the population data is distorted by prisoners, military personnel, and college students;
- distributions of any kind without regard to local fiscal capacity (in contrast to BEP grants that consider both required local services and local fiscal capacity);
- distributions from the Hall income tax to local governments based on the residence (city area or county area) of the taxpayer without regard to the number of local services provided, the level of services provided, local tax effort, or local fiscal capacity;
- distribution of gasoline and diesel fuel tax collections made to local governments without any consideration of actual road usage (Green et al. 2005. pp.2-7);

- special distributions to certain resort cities without regard to the level of local taxes generated from non-residents who visit such resort locations (Green et al. October 2004, pp. 44-48);
- none of the existing tax sharing arrangements with cities and counties reflects any consideration of which level of government provides each service and the level of service provided (Chervin 2006);
- existing tax sharing distributions are based on one or some combination of the following: (1) population, (2) land area, (3) situs of collection or taxpayer residence,<sup>16</sup> and (4) simple equal shares (Green et al. 2000, pp. 12-13);
- an almost blind attachment to historically-based criteria, some of which are over seventy years old; and
- a never-ending political response to change by attempting to hold all parties harmless by grandfathering in all parties that might be negatively affected by a distribution change even if the change is related to ongoing changes in the economic environment in which we live.

## DISTRIBUTION OPTIONS THAT REFLECT ACTUAL LOCAL SERVICE RESPONSIBILITIES AND LOCAL FISCAL CAPACITY

One might guess from the title of this section that this topic had never before been considered or discussed. In fact, it represents the two major considerations that drive Tennessee's Basic Education Program (since funding began in fiscal year 1992-93):

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<sup>15</sup> For a fuller description of the major inequities found in tax-sharing arrangements in Tennessee, see Green et al. January 2004, pp. 80-85.

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<sup>16</sup> Also known as a "return to origin" basis.

1. Calculate the cost of a reasonable K-12 education program in each school district.<sup>17</sup>
2. Calculate a measure of the fiscal capacity of each district, convert the estimate to a relative index or measure of capacity (vis-à-vis other school districts), then calculate each school districts share of its local program, with the balance financed with state aid. Poor districts generally pay a smaller share of their program costs than wealthier (measured by fiscal capacity) school districts.

Tennessee’s education equalization program took years to develop and finance, but the equalization finance program (and its progeny BEP 2.0) is now almost 19 years old, hardly a new concept. What is somewhat new is the concept of sharing state tax dollars with local governments using the same or similar methodology. While certainly an interesting political and administrative challenge, a broad outline of an equalization program for sharing state taxes with local governments (for non-education purposes) was described by Reschovsky<sup>18</sup> for consideration in Wisconsin:

1. “...the starting point is to define a package of basic services and to determine the minimum amount of money that will be required to deliver these services in each municipality.”<sup>19</sup>
2. “The second element is to determine the amount of fiscal effort that each municipality must make. The actual dollar contribution that each local government must make toward financing

“Badger Basics” will then depend upon the size of its property tax base.”<sup>20</sup>

3. “Those municipalities where the cost of providing the package of basic services exceeds the required local contribution would receive a shared revenue payment equal to the difference between the cost of basic services and required local revenues.”

There are several implications for such a program in Tennessee:

- Municipalities that do not provide significant services would not likely receive any funds.
- Municipalities that do not impose property taxes or impose low property taxes would not likely receive much in shared taxes.
- Counties that have a large portion of their citizens residing in cities that provide many local services will not receive as much funding as counties that provide all of most of the public services provided within the county.
- The cost of providing government services varies from location to location. Distributions formulas can be adjusted to reflect cost differences in the provision of public services.<sup>21</sup>
- For success, the state government must avoid maintaining prior shared tax levels through various “hold harmless” provisions that only serve to perpetuate poorly designed distributions of the past.

<sup>17</sup> In Tennessee, this includes county, city, and special school districts.

<sup>18</sup> Reschovsky 2002, p. 11.

<sup>19</sup> In Wisconsin, a major portion of local services are delivered by municipalities.

<sup>20</sup> “Badger Basics” refers to the package of basic services that each local government is expected to provide. The property tax reference reflects the fact that property taxes are the primary source of local revenue in Wisconsin.

<sup>21</sup> Bradberry 2007, p. 22 notes the “We find that communities with greater population density, number of commuters, population size, unemployment, and poverty have to spend more per capita to provide a standard bundle of municipal services; that is, they have higher uncontrollable costs.”

- A new tax sharing arrangement can include a minimum per capita amount of aid to “help bring everyone to the table” or a reasonable transition period during which time the “new” method supplants the “old” methods.

## STATE TAX SHARING ARRANGEMENTS IN OTHER STATES

There is no one-stop-statistical-shopping site for information on how states that share tax revenues with local governments actually distribute such funds.<sup>22</sup> Prior surveys generally reflected distribution methods similar to those currently in use in Tennessee. Those methods include historical-based methods such as (1) situs of tax collections, (2) population, and (3) road miles. A few states have formally recognized the limitations of their existing distribution schemes in addressing the issues of local fiscal imbalances.<sup>23</sup> A few states have actually implemented tax-sharing programs that consider local non-school service needs and local fiscal capacity in their tax-sharing arrangements.<sup>24</sup>

Despite the fact that most states now provide equalization funds to local governments to insure a more equitable distribution of primary and secondary education services, the same logic and reasonableness that drives equalization funds for education has not been

<sup>22</sup> See Zelio 2006.

<sup>23</sup> Fiscal imbalance is intended to refer to the problem of short and long run disconnects between government service responsibilities (actual or promised) and the revenue needed to finance such responsibilities. Tennessee’s BEP funding is an example of a state program that recognizes that there was a fundamental disconnect in some counties between the cost of a reasonable level of education services and the county’s ability to fund those services.

<sup>24</sup> Minnesota instituted a new LGA (local government aid) program in 2003 that considers “need” and “ability to raise local revenues.” In the past, Massachusetts distributed unrestricted local aid based on a similar design (no longer used).

embraced by states in guiding distribution of non-school aid to local governments.

## CONCLUSION

This report makes no specific recommendations in regard to the County Revenue Partnership Fund. While the intent of the CRPF is to facilitate future appropriations from future unearmarked state sales tax collections to county governments, it is not likely that any significant amounts will become available given current economic conditions.

The conclusion of this report is that any significant future appropriations to the CRPF will only occur as a result of some combination of the four factors:

1. Unexpected rapid growth in state sales tax collections
2. An increase in the state sales tax rate
3. Significant broadening of the sales tax base (that would increase both state and local sales tax collections)
4. Significant changes in the existing statutory tax sharing arrangements some of which date back to the early 20<sup>th</sup>

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